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21 Introduction
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of individual at-
titudes toward immigration in the welfare state. Existing studies have asked,
using opinion survey data, whether the observed variations in individual prefer-
ences for immigration restriction can be explained by economic characteristics of
the corresponding respondents. Persons with di¤erent economic characteristics
would be a¤ected di¤erently by immigrants with certain economic characteris-
tics, for the labor market and/or the public nance need adjust to immigration
by a¤ecting economic situations of persons who are already in the country. The
literature has been concerned with whether the variations in individual prefer-
ences for immigration restriction reect economically self-interested thinking.
Immigrant workers increase the stock of labor in their destination countries,
other things equal. If their labor can substitute for existing labor and does
not cost producers more than the ongoing pay, the existing, replaceable work-
ers should like to stop such immigration. However, there are also other pro-
duction factors, such as capital, that immigrant labor can complement. The
owners of such factors should demand immigrant workers. An economically
self-interested persons preference for immigration restriction should then be
explained by her/his factor endowments.1 For instance, the cross country stud-
1The argument here is one of the short run because production factors owned by existing
workers are assumed to be xed. This assumption might well be appropriate for instance
for existing senior workers who nd it di¢ cult to adjust their labor skills to changing labor
market conditions. On the other hand, preferences based on the short-run perspective may be
inappropriate if the quality and the quantity of production factors owned by citizens can react
to immigration through for example human capital investment. In such a case, even existing
workers who can be substituted by immigrants may benet by changing their labor skills
in a longer run, which may in turn cause a gradual increase in the intensity of competition
in labor markets that are not directly a¤ected by immigration in the short run. Thus,
individual preferences for immigration restriction depend not only on the factors that citizens
currently own but also on the factors that they can own in the future. Whether short-
or long-run perspective is more important to preferences for immigration restriction than
the other is an empirical question. This endogeneity was emphasized by Chiswick (1989).
Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Tamura (2004) theoretically analyzed how it would divide
3ies by Mayda (2006: Table 3A, Specication 8) and ORourke and Sinnott (2006:
Table 4) found that, in developed countries, those whose occupations required
high skills were less likely to prefer immigration restriction than those whose oc-
cupations required low skills. Since the skill levels of immigrants are generally
low relative to those of natives in developed countries, the nding provides some
evidence that individual preferences for immigration restriction reect economic
reasoning based on factor endowments.2
If immigrants are on average net users of the welfare system, immigration
implies a need for extra revenue, other things equal. In developed countries
where taxation is progressive, high-income residents would then have a dispro-
portionately larger share of the increased burden than low-income residents,
while persons with very low income may not need to share that burden at all.
If the government decides to cut benets rather than generate extra revenue, the
burden-sharing position of high- and low-income residents would change, assum-
ing that govenment benets form a larger part of the total income for low- than
high-income persons. The argument suggests that individual preferences for
restricting immigration depend on whether immigrants are on average thought
to contribute to or benet from government co¤ers in net terms. However, the
magnitude of immigrations net scal impact that is felt at the individual level
depends on the income level of the resident in question as well as the scal ad-
justment channel.3 Hanson, Scheve and Slaughters (2005: Table 8) US study
and Facchini and Maydas (2006: Tables 3 and 4) cross country study provide
some evidence that high-income residents were more likely to prefer immigra-
heterogeneous citizens by their preferences. See also footnote 12.
2See also Scheve and Slaughters (2001) US study, Dustmann and Prestons (2004) UK
study and Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002: Chapters 5 and 13).
3See footnote 18.
4tion restriction than low-income residents in states/countries where immigrants
were net beneciaries.
This paper provides additional evidence on whether the variations in indi-
vidual preferences for immigration restriction reect economically self-interested
thinking. Our contributions to the literature are twofold. First, we nd that
the variations in personal views about immigrantsoverall impacts on the na-
tional labor market and the domestic public nance are not able to explain the
variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction. Earlier studies
found that personal opinions about the labor market impact of immigration
inuenced individual preferences for immigration restriction, eg, the US studies
by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996: Table A8) and Citrin, Green, Muste and
Wong (1997: Table 1, Specications III and V) and the cross country study by
Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000: Table 6). Citrin et al. also found
that opinions about the net scal impact of immigration mattered to preferences
for restricting immigration.
However, the results of these single-equation studies might have su¤ered
from an endogeneity problem if personal opinions about immigrantseconomic
impact are correlated with unobservable characteristics of respondents that may
be contained in the error term. For example, some persons would have generally
negative attitudes toward foreigners, which would result in a preference for im-
migration restriction as well as a negative opinion about immigrantseconomic
impact. In an attempt to deal with this potential problem, some single-equation
studies use proxy variables based on responses to questions that are related to,
for instance, racism. Having several subjective regressors in an equation may,
however, introduce multicollinearity. Hence we take a di¤erent approach.
5We estimate the reduced forms for the personal opinions and the structural
equation for the individual preferences jointly, exploiting the correlations among
such omitted unobservable characteristics across the equations that belong to
a particular person. We compare the estimates from univariate and multivari-
ate probit models and nd that, while both labor market and public nance
concerns show both statistically and practically signicant contributions to the
variations in individual preferences for immigration restriction in the case of
univariate probit, the statistical signicance disappears in the case of multivari-
ate probit. Our results might suggest that concerns about overall economic
e¤ects of immigration were not important factors for EU citizenspreferences
for restricting immigration from poorer European countries.
Second, we nd somewhat unexpectedly that employers were more likely to
prefer immigration restriction than the rest in our sample of 7 EU countries
about a year before the May 2004 expansion of the Union.4 Existing studies
do not distinguish between employers and the others, while employers are often
thought to benet from the availability of immigrant labor. Our nding is
counterintuitive at rst glance. However, there is some evidence that self-
employed immigrants from Eastern Europe had been on the increase since the
signing of Europe Agreements between the then EU members and candidate
countries in the 1990s. The agreements allowed citizens of the latter to set
up their own businesses in the former, encouraging east-west migration via the
self-employment route. Our nding might imply that employers were concerned
with competition intensied by immigration.
The next section describes the data. Section 3 presents preliminary results
4The seven countries are Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. See Subsection 2.2 for the reasons for concentrating on these countries.
6from univariate probit estimation. Section 4 describes the trivariate probit
model used for the main results presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
All the tables referred to in Sections 3 and 5 are attached to the end of the
paper.
2 Data
Round 1 of the European Social Survey (ESS hereafter) was conducted during
the period 2002-2003. ESS is a biennial survey that covers more than 20
countries in Europe. The target population of each country consists of all
persons at the age of 15 or over who reside in the country. The survey consists
of core and rotating modules, and one of Round 1s two rotating modules is
dedicated to revealing individual opinions about immigration-related issues by
using almost 60 questions. This immigration module was framed by giving
each respondent the following introduction: People come to live in [the country
where the respondent was questioned] from other countries for di¤erent reasons.
Some have ancestral ties. Others come to work here, or to join their families.
Others come because theyre under threat. Here are some questions about this
issue.5
We concentrate on citizens in the then member countries of the European
Union. By restricting the set of observations to these countries, and by focusing
on individual preferences with respect to the immigration from poorer countries
in Europe,6 we implicitly examine the determinants of pre-enlargement EU citi-
5By the use of live, the permanency of immigrantsstay is deliberately made ambiguous.
See Chapter 3 (Part 1) of the ESS Round 1 2002/2003 Technical Report (Edition 2, June
2004) for the aim and outline of the immigration-related questions. We used Edition 5.1 of
the data set that was released at http://ess.nsd.uib.no on 15 December 2004.
6See the following subsection about the main dependent variable, anti.
7zenspreferences for restricting immigration from the countries that were about
to join the Union in May 2004. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data on explana-
tory variables of interest,7 we deal with only a subset of the EU15 countries, ie,
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. In total, we have 13,109 observations in these 7 countries.
2.1 Dependent variables
We have 3 dependent variables of interest. The rst one captures each citizens
personal view about immigrations impact on the national labor market. It is
based on the responses to the following ESS question:
 Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away
from workers in [the country where the respondent was questioned] or help
create new jobs?
Each respondent was asked to choose one of 11 categories that were ordered
from 0(= take away) to 10(= help create). We collapse these to create a
binary variable, labor, that indicates whether citizen i anticipated a negative
labor market e¤ect of immigration, ie,8
labori =
8>><>>:
1 if either 0,1,2,3or 4was selected
0 otherwise.
Note that this variable does not necessarily capture a citizens opinion about
immigrations e¤ect on some specic labor markets that are relevant to the
7See Subsection 2.2 about explanatory variables.
8The proportion of missing observations in each country is low: the highest is .063 in
Denmark. The reason why we dichotomize this and the following two ordered categorical
variables is because we do not have a program that implements trivariate ordered probit at
our disposal. See Section 4 about the model.
8respondent: the question asks about its overall impact on the national labor
market. However, we will later nd some sign that implies that labor might
well capture economic self-interest.
The second dependent variable captures a citizens view about immigrations
net impact on the domestic public nance. It is based on the responses to the
following question:
 Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use
health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come
here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?
Each respondent was asked to choose one of 11 categories that were ordered
from 0(= take more out) to 10(= put more in). We collapse these to create
a binary variable, fiscal, that indicates whether citizen i anticipated a negative
net e¤ect of immigration on his/her countrys public nance, ie,9
fiscali =
8>><>>:
1 if either 0,1,2,3or 4was selected
0 otherwise.
Note that, the same as labor, this variable does not necessarily capture a
citizens opinion about immigrations impact on the person through its e¤ect
on the domestic public nance. However, we will later nd some evidence that
fiscal might well capture economic self-interest.
One objective of the paper is to examine determinants of labor and fiscal.
However, the papers main purpose is to investigate how important these per-
sonal opinions are to individual preferences for immigration restriction. There-
9The proportion of missing observations in each country is low: the highest is .072 in
Denmark.
9fore, we use these two opinion variables to explain our third dependent variable
that indicates whether a respondent had a preference for immigration restric-
tion. We are interested in pre-expansion EU citizenspreferences with respect
to immigration from the countries that were about to join the Union in 2004.
The variable is hence based on the responses to the following question:10
 To what extent do you think [the country where the respondent was ques-
tioned] should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to come and
live here?
Each respondent was asked to choose one of the following 4 ordered cate-
gories: none, a few, someand many. We collapse these to create a binary
variable, anti, that indicates a preference for immigration restriction, ie,11
antii =
8>><>>:
1 if either noneor a fewwas selected
0 otherwise.
We should note that the questions on which labor and fiscal are based did
not ask specically about migrants from poorer European countries. We need
bear this in mind in interpreting our results.
2.2 Explanatory variables
Immigration restriction is likely to be preferred by existing workers who ex-
pect immigrant workers to a¤ect them adversely in their labor markets. Those
10This question does not explicitly concentrate on the newly joining countries, but this is the
best question for our purpose among the other similar questions about immigration restriction
in the survey. The World Banks World Development Indicators 2003 show that, in 2001, the
7 pre-enlargement EU countries in our sample had both GDP per capita and GNP per capita
higher in real terms than the 10 newly joining countries.
11The proportion of missing observations in each country is low: the highest is .047 in
Denmark.
10
workers who can easily be substituted by immigrants might fear an immedi-
ate increase in the intensity of labor market competition. The other workers
who cannot easily be replaced by immigrants might see potential benets of
immigration if they are complementary to immigrants in production.12
Accordingly, the rst variable of interest is a continuous measure that ap-
proximates the degree of labor market competition between each respondent
and immigrants, which we created by using Eurostat Census 2001. Table 2.1
presents the share of foreigners in each industrys total employment in a coun-
try, divided by the share of foreigners in that countrys total employment.13 If
a gure exceeds 1, it indicates that the share of foreigners in the corresponding
sectors employment is relatively high in the country. Unfortunately, we do not
have corresponding gures for Belgium, which is the reason why we drop the
Belgian observations from the sample.
Not surprisingly, in all 14 countries, the hotel and restaurant industry used
12LaLonde and Topel (1991) found that the impact of immigration on nativesearnings is
insignicant in the United States. Altonji and Card (1991) found a signicantly negative but
small e¤ect of immigration on nativeswages in the country. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992:
Tables 7.7 and 7.8) found that immigration reduced earnings of unskilled workers relative to
skilled workers in the country by increasing the supply of unskilled labor. Friedberg and Hunt
(1995) reviewed these and other studies on the labor market impact of immigration in the
United States in detail and concluded that it is negative but trivial. See also LaLonde and
Topel (1997: 819-827) for another review. The past studies typically examined correlations
between native wages and the presence of immigrants by location, eg, US metropolitan areas,
and found them negative but weak or insignicant. This might be because of nativesreactions
to immigration, eg, moving to another location or industry. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller
(1996) separated their data by native mobility and found that the growth of foreign workers
slowed the growth of wages for unskilled native workers who stayed with the same rm, while
the wage growth among those who moved to another rm was not a¤ected in Austria. Borjas
(2003) dened labor skill in terms of both education and work experience and made the size
of the native workforce in each group stable over time, lessening the complication that arises
from nativesreactions to immigration in the labor market. He then found a 10% increase in
immigration in a skill group depressed the corresponding wage by 3 to 4 percent in the United
States. De New and Zimmermann (1994) found not only a negative wage impact on unskilled
natives but also a small positive wage e¤ect on skilled natives in Germany. Gang and Rivera-
Batiz (1994) suggest that education, work experience and unskilled labor are complementary
inputs. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show that the positive wage e¤ect is likely to be dominant
because immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes. See also footnote 1.
13OECD has produced a similar table in its annual publication, Trends in International
Migration, but it does not give the gures as we do in Table 2.1. In addition, ours is more
disaggregated than OECDs in terms of economic activity. Although we focus on only 7 of
these countries, we also present gures for the others to show that the presence of foreign
workers depends on both industry and country.
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many foreign workers (category h). Another industry is of household activities
(category p), eg, housemaids. In the other industries, however, we see variations
across the countries. We also conrm our expectation that the use of the average
skill level of immigrant workers which tends to be low relative to citizens in
these countries is not suitable for representing labor substitutability. For
instance, while the construction sector (category f) hired many foreign workers
in more than half the countries, they also seem to have been highly present in
the education sector (category m) in Finland and the health and social service
sector (category n) in the United Kingdom. The required skills in immigrant-
concentrated sectors thus vary considerably.
ESS collected a two-digit NACE Rev.1 code for each respondent, and hence
we know to which NACE Rev.1 major group he or she belonged. We assign
the relevant gure in Table 2.1 to each ESS respondent.14 We call this variable
isb. Unfortunately, a two-digit NACE Rev.1 code is not available for more than
20 percent of respondents in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. We drop
observations in these countries from the sample, for we do not have su¢ cient
information for imputation.15 Furthermore, in the remaining 10 countries, we
removed observations that belonged to extraterritorial organizations (category
q). The sector should naturally employ many foreign workers, and Table 2.1
conrms that in 5 countries. The exclusion of the observations should remove
outliers, for the proportion of citizens who belonged to such an organization in
14This variable is similar to what Mayda (2006: Table 3A, Specications 11 and 12) con-
structed at the occupation level. The assumption is that a high ratio indicates that immigrants
can easily substitute for natives in that industry in the country. However, it might well be the
case that a high ratio is a technological consequence of an optimal combination of immigrants
and natives who complement each other.
15Note that coding was based on each respondents answer to the following question: What
does or did the rm or organization you work or worked for mainly do or make? Since a
respondent could give an answer based on the past work, the respondents without a NACE
Rev.1 code are not identical with the unemployed.
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each of these 5 countries is extremely low: the highest is .015 in France.
The second variable of interest is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a
respondent was unemployed and looking for a job in the last seven days and
0 otherwise.16 By using this binary variable, we check whether unemployed
workers were more likely to think that immigrants have a negative labor market
e¤ect than the others. We call this variable unemploy.
The third variable of interest is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a
respondent employed at least one person and 0 otherwise.17 Our expectation is
that employers are less likely to prefer immigration restriction, for they might
benet from immigrants who could reduce the cost of production via their im-
pact on the labor market or increase the returns to production factors that are
owned by employers and are complementary to immigrant labor. We call this
variable employer.
We are also interested in potential inuence of public nance concerns on
individual preferences for immigration restriction. Suppose immigrants are
thought to become net users of the welfare state after entry. Existing net
beneciaries of the welfare state might then worry about a potential cut in the
size of net benet per capita. Net contributors to the welfare state might
also fear a potential increase in the tax burden per capita. If immigrants are
thought to become net contributors to the welfare state after entry, citizens
of both types might recognize some net scal benet of immigration.18 This
necessitates us to have two variables. One is to capture the position of a
16We do not include those who were unemployed but were not looking for a job. Hence
the dummy variable is not contaminated by the welfare-dependent unemployed, provided that
the respondents were honest.
17Each respondent was asked the following question: How many employees do or did you
have if any? This suggests that the respondent who is classied as an employer could also be
an employee because the person might have referred to any past hiring or self-employment.
For instance, a respondent could be a company employee who hired a housemaid at home.
18The following table summarizes what the paragraph suggests.
14
respondent in the welfare state a net contributor or a net beneciary. The
other is to capture a respondents perception of immigrants position in the
welfare state net contributors or net beneciaries. The latter is one of our
dependent variables, ie, fiscal.
Accordingly, our fourth variable of interest is a measure of intra-country
relative income per capita. This captures the position of each respondent
in the welfare state: a lower/higher value of this measure implies the person is
more likely to be a net beneciary/contributor. ESS collected each respondents
estimate of net household income in 12 ordered categories. The categories do
not share an equal interval. We assign the mid-value of each categorys income
range to the respondents in that category. The highest category has no upper
bound and hence no mid-value. However, it contains only 0.78 percent of the
whole sample and, at the country level, at most 2.79 percent in the UK sample.
Therefore, we drop the observations in that category.
We then divide each gure by the corresponding number of household mem-
bers because we examine the importance of economic self-interest to individual
opinions. This yields net income per capita assuming, although unrealistic, that
household income is shared equally by the members. We nally divide each
gure by the corresponding national mean net income per capita. The variable
measures the relative income position of each respondent in her/his country.
For instance, 1.5 implies that the respondents net income is 50 percent higher
than the national average. We call this variable relinc.
We have already reduced our sample from 15 to 10 countries due to insu¢ -
Immigrants are net ... Beneciaries Contributors
An adjustment is expected via ... Benet Tax Benet Tax
Residents with ... Low income against against/n.a. for for/n.a.
High income against/n.a. against for/n.a. for
n.a. = not applicable
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cient data on isb. We further drop Austria, Germany and Portugal from our
sample because of a severe lack of data on relinc in these countries, eg, as much
as over 50 percent of the Austrian sample. Again, we do not have su¢ cient
information for imputation. For instance, education is often thought to be a
good proxy for personal income. However, we found the correlation between
relinc and education is rather weak in the data. This is advantageous to our
analysis, however, because we want to separate the inuence of education and
that of income on the dependent variables.19
We also create more direct measures to indicate whether a respondent was
a net beneciary of the welfare state. ESS contains the data on the main
source of each respondents household income. There are 3 categories related
to social welfare benets: pension, unemployment or redundancy benetand
other social welfare benet.20 We create dummy variables, pension, unempb
and otherb, respectively for these categories. Note that we created earlier
a binary variable which indicates whether a respondent was unemployed and
looking for a job in the last seven days, ie, unemploy. This variable is not the
same as unempb because the latter refers to the household while the former is
about the individual. We nd that, in each of the 7 countries, the number of
unemployed respondents whose households mainly depended on benets related
to unemployment or redundancy is lower than the total number of respondents
19 In the samples used by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and Facchini and Mayda
(2006), the progressivity of taxation and the generosity of social welfare provision vary ac-
cording to the location of a respondent. However, across the 7 countries we examine, these
do not vary su¢ ciently. Their net replacement ratios (the ratio of the net income during
unemployment to the net income during employment) given by OECD (2004: Table 3.3b) fall
between .65 and .78. Their di¤erences between the average wage tax rates for single persons
without a child who earn 67 percent and 167 percent of the annual wage earnings of an average
production worker given by OECD (2003: Table 1) fall between .057 and .176.
20Pension is not specied as public pension in the list of alternatives and hence potentially
include both public and private pension. However, the list includes income from investment,
savings and the likeas an alternative, which might be likely to be chosen in the case of private
pension. Hence we assume pensionmainly represents public, rather than private, pension.
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whose households mainly depended on such benets.
Other explanatory variables include purely exogenous variables such as a
respondents gender (female) and approximate age in years in 2003. Each
respondents level of education is indicated by 3 edu dummies.21 We also
have an indicator of whether at least one parent of a respondent was born
abroad (fparent). By this dummy variable, we try to capture inherently dif-
ferent attitudes between immigrant-originating citizens and native citizens. A
respondents closeness to immigrants is approximated by the number of immi-
grant friends she/he had (2 friend dummies). In addition, we use a measure
of a respondents exposure to the media on current a¤airs and politics (media)
in hours per weekday.22 The media is often thought to inuence ones view,
and we want to control such potential inuence. Table 2.2 provides summary
statistics for our variables.
3 Preliminary results
In this section, we examine the determinants of labor, fiscal and anti in turn.
We present univariate probit results which we will subsequently compare with
the corresponding multivariate probit results to check if the results in this section
are robust. In all specications, we include age, female, fparent, media,
friend dummies and country dummies as exogenous variables. The reference
21ESS sorted respondents into 7 groups according to a modied version of ISCED97. We
collapse these into 4 groups by merging less than primaryand primary or basic (1st stage),
upper secondaryand postsecondary (non-tertiary), and tertiary (1st stage)and tertiary
(2nd stage). The reason for merging is to avoid having a category with a very small number
of observations in some countries.
22We create this variable by using the responses to the 3 separate questions: On an average
weekday, how much of your time is spent watching television (A2) / listening to the radio
(A4) / reading newspapers (A6) about politics and current a¤airs? The responses to these
questions were given on the same scale that has an equal interval in hours between categories.
This enables us to aggregate the responses at the individual level.
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group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend nor a parent who was
born abroad. Each observation is ESS-weighted in estimation.23 The four
tables for this section will report estimated marginal e¤ects at the sample mean
of each explanatory variable or di¤erences between 0 and 1 in the case of binary
explanatory variables.
3.1 Labor market concern
We rst examine the determinants of labor by univariate probit. Table 3.1
reports estimated marginal e¤ects for four specications. Specication 3.1A
adds isb to the right side of the equation. Its estimated marginal e¤ect is
insignicant, although the sign is positive as we expected, ie, a high value of
isb implies that the respondent can easily be substituted by immigrant workers.
We nd that the likelihood of anticipating a negative labor market impact of
immigration would be lower by .06 if at least one parent was born abroad than
otherwise. The estimated marginal e¤ects of friend dummies suggest that the
more immigrant friends a respondent had the less likely he/she was to expect a
negative labor market impact of immigration. The probability of labor = 1 is
lower by 0.18 among those who had several immigrant friends than those who
had none. These estimates of fparent and friend dummies may represent
e¤ects of a respondents proximity to immigrants on her/his personal view. We
additionally nd that the number of hours spent on the media about current
a¤airs and politics per weekday had a negative marginal e¤ect on the likelihood:
the estimate suggests that 5 additional hours exposed to the media may lower
the probability of labor = 1 from the sample mean by .10. This might be a
23See footnote 5.
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consequence of acquiring various views on the issue via a larger number of hours
spent on the media: those who are not well exposed to di¤erent opinions may
well form a biased view. The estimated marginal e¤ects of media, fparent and
friend dummies are the same in sign and similar in magnitude across the four
specications in the table.
[Table 3.1 about here]
Specication 3.1B adds two dummy variables of interest to 3.1A, namely,
unemploy and employer. We nd the estimated marginal e¤ects of both vari-
ables signicant. The sign of the e¤ect of unemploy is positive: the unemployed
were more likely to think than the rest that immigrants impact on the national
labor market would be negetaive. This seems to conrm our expectation that
they are the ones who fear a further increase in labor market competition. The
result agrees with the nding by Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000: Ta-
ble 3, Model 4). The sign of the estimated marginal e¤ect of employer also
conrms our expectation that employers would be less likely to anticipate a neg-
ative labor market e¤ect of immigration than the rest because they are likely
to own production factors that complement immigrant labor. These ndings
seem to imply that, although labor is about immigrations general impact on the
national labor market, it might reect each respondents economic self-interest.
Specication 3.1C further adds educational attainment dummies to 3.1B.
The reference group had achieved a uppersecondary or nontertiary postsec-
ondary level (edu2). These dummiesestimated marginal e¤ects indicate that
the level of educational attainment is negatively related to the likelihood of ex-
20
pecting a negative labor market impact of immigration.24 We observe that
the e¤ects of unemploy and employer survive after controlling education, while
the e¤ect of isb not only remains insignicant but also becomes smaller in size.
Specication 3.1D drops isb from 3.1C. This exclusion does not change what
3.1C suggests, and the resulting fall in the pseudo-R2 is small.25
Some studies in the literature interpret the signicant, negative e¤ect of
education as a conrmation that citizens expect immigrants to be relatively
unskilled and to substitute existing unskilled labor and complement skilled labor
in the destination. To interpret our results in this way, rst we need to assume
that the respondentsanswers that generate labor reect economic self-interest.
In other words, they took the labor-market question given in subsection 2.1
personally, ignoring the word generallyin it. The estimated marginal e¤ects
of unemploy and employer may indicate that this might well be the case.
Suppose this is the case. Then, we can check whether our edu dummies
can be interpreted as proxies for labor skills by splitting the sample by labor
force participation. We thus follow Scheve and Slaughter (2001). Among those
who were out of the labor force, labor skills should not matter. We estimated
specication 3.1C by splitting our sample in two ways.26 In one case, we treat
those in education as being out of the labor force. In the other case, we treat
them as being in the labor force. Table 3.2 shows that edu dummies exhibit
the same relationship with labor whether respondents were in or out of the
labor force. Accordingly, we are unable to treat edu dummies as proxies for
24Note that, once education is controlled, a signicantly positive marginal e¤ect of the Irish
dummy (ie) becomes insignicant. This might be due to the fact that the level of educational
attainment is on average lower in Ireland than in the UK in our sample.
25The psedo-R2 is McFaddens (1974) and is dened as 1   L1=L0 where L1 is the log
pseudolikelihood of the model and L0 is that of the constant-only model.
26By using Question F8a,b of ESS, respondents whose main activity was paid workor a
search for a job because of being unemployedare classied as being in the labor force.
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labor skills in our sample. We therefore take the position that has been taken
mainly by non-economists: education is associated with less negative attitude
in general, eg, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007).
[Table 3.2 about here]
Table 3.2 gives us a few additional insights. First, it implies that a signif-
icant, negative marginal e¤ect of employer comes from those who were out of
the labor force. The magnitude is larger in Table 3.2 than in Table 3.1. Those
who were both employed and employing simultaneously do not indicate a lower
likelihood of perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration. Sec-
ond, the estimated marginal e¤ect of isb is positive and signicant among those
who were out of the labor force. As we discussed in subsection 2.2, the sector of
each respondent is based on his/her current as well as past work. Therefore, isb
gures exist even among those who were out of the labor force. The signicant
positive marginal e¤ects in the second and the fourth columns might well imply
that there were respondents who had to leave the labor force because of the
competition that was intensied by foreign workers in certain sectors.
3.2 Public nance concern
In this subsection, we examine the determinants of fiscal by univariate probit.
Specication 3.3A in Table 3.3 adds a variable of main interest, relinc, to the
right side of the equation. Its estimated marginal e¤ect is negative and signif-
icant at 5 percent, which suggests that lower intranational net relative income
per capita results in a higher probability of perceiving a negative net impact of
22
immigration on the domestic public nance. This might be in line with the
case where current social welfare beneciaries are more concerned with a poten-
tial increase in the number of net beneciaries because they fear benet cuts.
However, the magnitude of the e¤ect is small: it implies that a 50 percentage
point decrease in the relative income position from the sample mean, ie, from
1 to .5, would increase the probability only by .003. The estimated marginal
e¤ects of media, friend dummies and fparent are all negative as in Table 3.1
for labor in the previous subsection.
[Table 3.3 about here]
Specication 3.3B adds three dummy variables of interest to 3.3A, namely,
pension, unempb and otherb. We nd that none of these dummies has a
signicant marginal e¤ect on the probability of perceiving a negative net scal
impact of immigration. We also observe that the estimated marginal e¤ect
of relinc becomes insignicant. The estimated marginal e¤ects of the other
control variables do not change. Note that, although the estimated e¤ects of
relinc, pension, unempb and otherb are individually insignicant, we found that
they are jointly signicant at 1 percent.
Specication 3.3C therefore does not drop any of these but further adds
edu dummies to 3.3B. The estimated marginal e¤ect of relinc then regains
statistical signicance, but with the positive sign this time. This suggests
that after controlling education there is a positive relationship between the
intranational relative net income per capita and the likelihood of perceiving a
negative net scal impact of immigration. A theoretical explanation for this
relationship is that, under a progressive taxation system, a person with higher
23
earnings is a¤ected by scal adjustments via taxation disproportionately more
than someone with lower earnings. Hence high-income earners should be more
concerned with a potentially negative impact of immigration on the domestic
public nance than the others. The inclusion of edu dummies does not make any
of pension, unempb and otherb important, although they are jointly signicant
at 5 percent. Specication 3.3D drops these three dummies from 3.3C, but
we nd that the estimated marginal e¤ects of the other explanatory variables
remain almost the same. The marginal e¤ects of edu dummies indicate that
the higher educational attainment a respondent had the less likely she/he was
to perceive a negative net scal impact of immigration. Thus, as we found in
Table 3.1 for explaining labor, education seems to reduce the probability that a
person expresses a negative view regarding economic impacts of immigration.
3.3 Preference for immigration restriction
We now use labor and fiscal as independent variables in explaining the varia-
tions in anti, for our main purpose is to investigate the importance of personal
views about immigrations economic impacts to individual preferences for immi-
gration restriction. Specication 3.4A in Table 3.4 suggests that the estimated
marginal e¤ects of both economic concerns are positive and signicant. Per-
ceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration seems to increase the
probability that the respondent prefers immigration restriction by .18. The
probability of preferring immigration restriction is greater by .20 among those
who perceived a negative net scal impact of immigration than those who did
not. The ndings seem to suggest that these two economic concerns are reason-
ably important factors behind individual preferences for immigration restriction.
24
The estimated marginal e¤ects of media, fparent and friend dummies are very
similar across the four specications in the table and also to the estimates in
Tables 3.1 and 3.3.
[Table 3.4 about here]
Specication 3.4B adds educational attainment dummies to 3.4A. The in-
clusion of these variables does not change the estimated marginal e¤ects of labor
and fiscal much. The estimated marginal e¤ects of the education dummies
conrm our expectation that the more educated a respondent was the less likely
the person was to be anti-immigration.
In the previous subsections, we found that both the status of being unem-
ployed and being an employer respectively made a di¤erence to the opinion
about the labor market impact of immigration. We also found that the opin-
ion about the net scal impact of immigration depended on the relative income
position. Specication 3.4C adds to 3.4B these variables interacted with the cor-
responding opinion variables. The estimated marginal e¤ect of laboremployer
is signicant and positive, suggesting that the contribution of labor market con-
cern to the likelihood of preferring immigration restriction might be much more
important for employers than for the rest. However, note that we found in
Table 3.1 that employers were less likely to perceive a negative labor market
impact of immigration. The estimated marginal e¤ect of fiscalrelinc in this
specication is signicant only at 90 percent.
Specication 3.4D adds to 3.4C more interaction terms to check whether
any of the variables which we found insignicant in Tables 3.1 and 3.3 makes
a di¤erence to the importance of labor and fiscal to anti. We nd none of
25
the added, interaction terms signicant, while the estimated marginal e¤ect of
fiscalrelinc becomes signicant at 99 percent. Its sign is negative, indicat-
ing that, although we found in Table 3.3 that relative income per capita was
positively related to the probability of perceiving a negative net scal impact
of immigration, the contribution of public nance concern to the probability of
preferring immigration restriction is less important to high- than low-income
earners among those who thought that immigrants were net beneciaries of the
welfare system.
4 Model
In our preliminary analysis, we estimated the three equations of interest sep-
arately by univariate probit. Table 3.4 suggested that the perception of a
negative impact of immigration on the national labor market and/or the do-
mestic public nance contributes to a preference for immigration restriction
from poorer countries in Europe. However, we suspect that both labor and
fiscal are endogenous in the equation for explaining anti. Let 1 [] be the in-
dicator function which is equal to 1 if the condition inside the square brackets
is met and 0 otherwise. Our model consists of the following three equations:
anti = 1 [1labor + 2fiscal + x11 + u1 > 0] (4.1)
labor = 1 [x22 + u2 > 0] (4.2)
fiscal = 1 [x33 + u3 > 0] (4.3)
Note that, for a given respondent, the error terms are likely to be correlated
through her/his unobservable characteristics, eg, negative/positive attitude in
26
general. If the correlation between u1 and u2 is not zero, u1 and labor are cor-
related. The univariate probit estimation of equation (4.1) is then inconsistent
for 1, 2 and 1.
27
Let us assume that u is independent of x and is trivariate-normally dis-
tributed with means zero, variances one and covariances ij where i; j = 1; 2; 3
indicate equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) respectively. If this assumption holds,
the maximum likelihood trivariate probit estimation of the three equations gives
consistent and asymptotically e¢ cient estimators. This is done by the use of
the GHK simulator.28
5 Main results
Table 5.1 presents the coe¤ecients from trivariate probit estimation of speci-
cations 3.4D, 3.1C and 3.3C.29 In the rst column, we have univariate pro-
bit coe¢ cients to be compared with trivariate probit coe¢ cients in the second
column. The results for the equation for anti di¤er between univariate and
trivariate probit. We notice that the estimated coe¢ cients on both labor and
fiscal become insignicant when we assume trivariate normal error terms, while
they are signicantly positive when we assume no correlation between each pair
of the error terms of the equations.
However, the positive coe¢ cient on laboremployer remains signicant. This
27See Wooldridge (2002: 477).
28We used mvprobit, the StataTM command by Cappellari and Jenkins, which uses the
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator to evaluate multidimensional normal integrals in the
likelihood function. The number of pseudo-random standard uniform variates being drawn
when calculating the simulated likelihood is 99: close to
p
n. Our study di¤ers from Dustmann
and Preston (2004; 2006) who estimated a system of equations in stages.
29Estimated marginal e¤ects from trivariate probit estimation is not directly comparable
with the ones from univariate probit estimation because there are eight types of predicted
probability for the former, eg, Pr (anti = 1; labor = 1; fiscal = 1). Hence we present esti-
mated coe¢ cients.
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seems to conrm our earlier nding that the contribution of labor market con-
cern to the probability of preferring immigration restriction might have been
important for employers if they perceived a negative e¤ect of immigration. We
also obtain a signicantly negative coe¢ cient on fiscalrelinc, which appears
to conrm our earlier nding that the contribution of public nance concern
to the probability of preferring immigration restriction might have been less
important for high- than low-income earners.
We also notice that the estimated coe¢ cients on media, fparent and friend
dummies are all insignicant in the case of trivariate probit, while they are all
signicant in the case of univariate probit. The negative coe¢ cients on Ireland
and Sweden are signicant, which appears to be consistent with the fact that
these two countries are the ones that immediately opened their labor market to
the newly joining member countries on 1 May 2004.
[Table 5.1 about here]
Turning to the equation for labor, the results from trivariate probit suggest
that neither the status of being unemployed nor the status of being an employer
makes a di¤erence in terms of perceiving a negative labor market impact of
immigration. This is in contrast to what the corresponding univariate probit
results suggest. The other coe¢ cients are roughly the same between univariate
and trivariate probit. Although the sign of the estimated coe¢ cient on isb
changes from positive to negative, it is signicant only at 10 percent.
Turning to the equation for fiscal, the trivaraite probit results are almost
the same as the corresponding univaraite probit results. We conrm that
the estimated coe¢ cient on the intracountry relative net income position is
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signicantly positive, suggesting that the higher the relative income position of
a respondent was the more likely the person was to anticipate a negative net
scal impact of immigration, other things equal.
Table 5.1 also provides, at its bottom, estimated correlation coe¢ cients be-
tween a pair of the error terms of the three equations. The gures suggest that
there is a positive correlation between the error terms of the equations for ex-
plaining labor and fiscal.30 This suggests that these equations share the same
unobservables in the error terms. However, negative 12 and 13 are small in
magnitude and also insignicant. These two correlation coe¢ cients measure
the associations between the error terms after the inuence of labor and fiscal
are accounted for in the equation for explaining anti. The two opinion variables
would include the unobservables, u2 and u3, respectively. This is probably the
reason why 12 and 13 are insignicant.
31
We have found neither labor nor fiscal signicant in the equation for ex-
plaining anti. However, we have some evidence of a positive association between
labor and fiscal. The weighted cross-product ratio between these opinion vari-
ables is 4.76, which indicates that the probability that both variables are equal
to 1 for a given citizen is almost 5 times as high as the probability that only
one of them is equal to 1. In addition, Table 5.1 shows large standard errors
for the estimated coe¢ cients on these variables in the case of trivariate probit.
Therefore, we check if multicollinearity is responsible for the insignicance of
these two opinion variables.
[Table 5.2 about here]
30Bivariate probit estimation results in a positive correlation of a similar order of magnitude
between the error terms of these two equations. The results are available upon request.
31See Greene (2003: 716-717).
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Specication 5.2A in Table 5.2 drops ve variables involving fiscal from
3.4D of Table 5.1, leaving four variables related to labor market concern in ex-
plaining anti. This exclusion does not make the estimated coe¢ cient on labor
signicant. However, as we found in Table 5.1, the estimated coe¢ cient on
laboremployer remains signicantly positive. As a result of the exclusion, the
negative coe¢ cients onmedia, fparent and friend dummies regain signicance.
We also notice that, as a result of the exclusion, 13 becomes signicantly pos-
itive while 12 remains insignicant. That is, the error terms of the equations
for explaining anti and fiscal now appear to share the same unobservables.
Specication 5.2B in Table 5.2 drops four variables involving labor from
3.4D of Table 5.1, leaving ve variables related to public nance concern in
explaining anti. The exclusion does not make the estimated coe¢ cient on
fiscal signicant. But, as we found in Table 5.1, the estimated coe¢ cient on
fiscalrelinc remains signicantly negative. We also note that the estimated
coe¢ cients on media and friend dummies are signicant only at 10 percent,
while that on fparent is insignicant. In Table 5.1, they were all insignicant.
As for the correlation between the error terms, we nd that both 12 and 13
are insignicant.
Specication 5.2C in the table drops all variables involving either labor or
fiscal from 3.4D of Table 5.1. As a result, we nd that both 12 and 13
become signicantly positive. This is probably because labor and fiscal contain
subjective bias that is not controlled in the equations for explaining these two
opinion variables.32
What the results in Table 5.2 suggest is that the insignicance of labor and
32 In these equations, we do not have an opinion variable on the right side.
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fiscal in explaining anti is perhaps not due to multicollinearity. Furthermore,
the nding that 12 is insignicant in Specication 5.2B implies that the un-
observables in the error term of the equation for explaining labor might be
contained in the variations in fiscalrelinc. In Table 5.3, we present estimated
coe¢ cients from seemingly unrelated trivariate probit where we drop the opin-
ion variables and instead include all variables of interest used to explain either
labor or fiscal. We want to check the e¤ect of each non-subjective variable
on our three dependent variables. The correlation coe¢ cients between a pair
of the error terms of the equations are all signicantly positive, which perhaps
captures unexplained subjective bias that each respondent had.
[Table 5.3 about here]
We nd relinc signicant in all three equations. It positively contributes to
the probability of perceiving a negative net scal impact of immigration, which
is consistent with our earlier nding. We nd that it negatively contributes
to the probability of perceiving a negative labor market impact of immigration
and also the probability of preferring immigration restriction. The negative
contribution to the latter is slightly smaller in magnitude compared with the
estimated coe¢ cients on fiscalrelinc in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, but it suggests
that not the interaction term but relinc on its own has a negative relationship
with anti.
We nd that, while unemploy remains insignicant, the estimated coe¢ -
cient on unempb is signicantly positive in explaining labor. Note that, while
unemploy indicates whether the respondent was unemployed, unempb indicates
whether the main source of household income was an unemployment benet.
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The nding might suggest that those who had to rely on unemployment bene-
ts for living form a more homogeneous group than those who were unemployed
and looking for a job. That is, a threat of labor market competition intensied
by immigrants might well be more serious for those who rely on unemployment
benets.
Citizens who depended on unemployment benets for living were less likely
to prefer immigration restriction even though they were more likely to think
that immigrants would have a negative impact on the national labor market.
Table 5.3 also suggests that those who relied on pension for living were more
likely to prefer immigration restriction.33
Finally, the table implies that employers were more likely to prefer immigra-
tion restriction than the others. The positive coe¢ cient is similar in magnitude
to those on laboremployer in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and this probably suggests
that not the interaction term but employer on its own has a positive relationship
with anti.
6 Discussion
One of the main ndings of this paper is that the variations in citizensopinions
about immigrantsoverall impact on the labor market and the public nance of
their countries do not explain the variations in their preferences for immigra-
tion restriction. It appears that although these economic issues were debated
with respect to the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the European
Union around the time of the 2004 expansion, they were not important to the
33Tamura (2006) constructed a model where pensionerspreferences for immigration restric-
tion are due to a potential increase in tax burden caused by immigrants. However, what we
observe in Table 5.3 does not suggest that this scal channel is important.
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preferences of the then EU citizens. Our two opinion variables are about over-
all e¤ects of immigration and are not necessarily the same as the anticipated
e¤ects specic to each respondent. However, we also found in the results from
the estimation of the reduced forms for the two opinion variables that these
variables seem to reect some economic self-interest of each respondent. The
results seem to suggest that perceived immigrantseconomic impact does not
determine whether a citizen is anti- or pro-immigration even if the impact in
question is specic to him/her. An implication is that economic arguments for
and against the free-movement-of-workers principle might not be able to inu-
ence the extent of citizenssupport for it, whether they respectively would gain
or lose economically.
Another nding which is also new to the literature is that citizen employers
were more likely to be anti-immigration than the rest. We expected the oppo-
site, ie, employers are more pro-immigration than the rest, by reasoning that
they would benet from immigrant labor that is likely to increase the returns to
production factors which they own. Immigrants may also solve labor shortage
at a low cost. Our nding is thus counterintuitive at rst glance. However,
there is some evidence that self-employed immigrants from Eastern Europe had
been on the increase since the mid-1990s. For instance, the UKs Home O¢ ce
(2004: 15) reports that the number of persons who were granted an extension
to stay in the country as a person of independent means or business persons
increased by 151 percent in 2003, and most of the increase is due to nationals
of Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania.34 In the period 1991-1996, the
signing of Europe Agreements between the then member countries and candi-
34See also OECD (2006: Table I.13).
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date countries took place. The agreements allowed nationals of the latter to
enter the Union via self-employment.35 Our nding might then imply that em-
ployers were concerned with competition intensied by immigration.36 If this
is the case, economic self-interest does matter to preferences for immigration
restriction.
The limitation of this study is that, as a consequence of attempting to pre-
serve a good representation of each countrys citizen population, our sample
contains only 7 EU countries of the pre-2004 enlargement. Since these coun-
tries are not very di¤erent from each other in terms of tax progressivity and
welfare generosity, we were unable to study welfare state determinants in the
way that Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006)
did.37 If ESS could conduct another immigration module from the EU27 coun-
tries in the future, this limitation might be overcome.
35An Europe Agreement was signed with Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Slovak Republic
(1993), Czech Republic (1993), Latvia (1995), Lithuania (1995), Estonia (1995) and Slovenia
(1996) of the 10 newly joining countries. The accession by Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972)
were not subject to Transitional Arrangements from 1 May 2004 onwards. Note also that
an Association Agreement was signed with Romania (1993) and Bulgaria (1993), providing
nationals of these countries with entries via self-employment. The agreements are in the
O¢ cial Journal of the European Union (europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/index.htm), and a list
of the relevant volumes of the jounal can be found in the document about the 2004 enlargement
(europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50017.htm).
36Although Belgium was excluded from our sample, European Industrial Relations Obser-
vatory (www.eiro.eurofound.europa.eu/2005/09/feature/be0509303f.html) gives a view shared
by Belgian building companies, which implies such intensied competition. They argue
that they lose a large number of contracts due to foreign subcontracting and pseudo-self-
employment. However, in their case, the solution is seen to be freedom for Belgian companies
to employ foreign construction workers in the country, which is more in line with our pre-
analysis expectation than the nding.
37Refer to footnote 19.
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Table 3.1 Probit estimates of marginal effects on the likelihood of 
perceiving a negative labor market effect of immigration
(labor = 1)
Specification 3.1A 3.1B 3.1C 3.1D
isb 0.016 0.017 0.006 ..
0.017 0.017 0.011
unemploy .. 0.069 *** 0.047 *** 0.048 ***
0.012 0.013 0.018
employer .. -0.029 *** -0.025 *** -0.021 ***
0.005 0.006 0.008
edu0 .. .. 0.078 *** 0.071 ***
0.008 0.008
edu1 .. .. 0.022 0.024
0.019 0.017
edu3 .. .. -0.150 *** -0.143 ***
0.007 0.009
media -0.022 *** -0.022 *** -0.019 *** -0.015 **
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007
friend1 -0.097 *** -0.097 *** -0.077 *** -0.073 ***
0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
friend2 -0.186 *** -0.185 *** -0.156 *** -0.146 ***
0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007
fparent -0.060 *** -0.062 *** -0.068 *** -0.082 ***
0.015 0.014 0.011 0.011
female -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.006
0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008
age 0.000 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
dk -0.234 *** -0.234 *** -0.233 *** -0.233 ***
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002
fi -0.121 *** -0.121 *** -0.122 *** -0.125 ***
0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005
fr -0.064 *** -0.065 *** -0.077 *** -0.081 ***
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006
ie 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.006 0.016
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003
nl -0.188 *** -0.188 *** -0.190 *** -0.188 ***
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
se -0.242 *** -0.242 *** -0.246 *** -0.243 ***
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
obs. 11718.000 11712.000 11706.000 12559.000
log pseudolikelihood -6957.895 -6949.914 -6798.416 -7337.913
pseudo-R^2 0.061 0.061 0.081 0.076
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who attained the uppersecondary or the nontertiary 
postsecondary level of education (edu2) and had neither an immigrant friend (friend0)
nor a parent who was born abroad.
Table 3.2 Probit estimates of marginal effects on the likelihood of 
perceiving a negative labor market effect of immigration
(labor = 1) by labor-force participation
Treating those in education as …
1. Out of the labor force 2. In the labor force
… the labor force In Out of In Out of
isb -0.002 0.013 ** -0.003 0.015 ***
0.013 0.006 0.012 0.004
unemploy 0.042 *** .. 0.051 *** ..
0.014 0.013
employer 0.012 -0.075 ** -0.001 -0.058 ***
0.026 0.027 0.019 0.017
edu0 0.062 *** 0.073 *** 0.045 *** 0.097 ***
0.019 0.017 0.017 0.013
edu1 0.023 * 0.025 0.016 0.041
0.013 0.033 0.016 0.028
edu3 -0.159 *** -0.136 *** -0.156 *** -0.132 ***
0.011 0.024 0.011 0.024
media -0.016 -0.025 *** -0.016 -0.026 ***
0.010 0.004 0.011 0.005
friend1 -0.063 *** -0.093 * -0.073 *** -0.078
0.009 0.048 0.009 0.058
friend2 -0.132 *** -0.188 *** -0.143 *** -0.179 ***
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
fparent -0.065 ** -0.074 ** -0.075 *** -0.054
0.030 0.030 0.025 0.032
female 0.005 -0.010 -0.007 0.001
0.014 0.011 0.010 0.019
age -0.002 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
dk -0.244 *** -0.201 *** -0.243 *** -0.187 ***
0.002 0.008 0.002 0.010
fi -0.148 *** -0.077 *** -0.149 *** -0.047 ***
0.004 0.007 0.004 0.009
fr -0.099 *** -0.040 *** -0.090 *** -0.053 ***
0.003 0.009 0.002 0.013
ie -0.020 *** 0.055 *** -0.021 *** 0.072 ***
0.004 0.013 0.005 0.017
nl -0.201 *** -0.168 *** -0.199 *** -0.168 ***
0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005
se -0.249 *** -0.233 *** -0.243 *** -0.240 ***
0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008
obs. 6871.000 4835.000 7636.000 4070.000
log pseudolikelihood -3908.070 -2874.243 -4328.709 -2445.989
pseudo-R^2 0.091 0.071 0.092 0.067
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
For the out-of-the-labor-force group, unemploy is not applicable.
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a
parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary
postsecondary level of education (edu2).
Table 3.3 Probit estimates of marginal effects on the likelihood of 
perceiving a negative net fiscal effect of immigration
(fiscal = 1)
Specification 3.3A 3.3B 3.3C 3.3D
relinc -0.006 ** -0.003 0.019 *** 0.017 ***
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005
pension .. 0.031 0.018 ..
0.035 0.034
unempb .. -0.003 -0.017 ..
0.079 0.085
otherb .. 0.046 0.033 ..
0.063 0.065
edu0 .. .. 0.045 ** 0.047 **
0.018 0.021
edu1 .. .. 0.024 * 0.024 *
0.013 0.013
edu3 .. .. -0.119 *** -0.119 ***
0.033 0.031
media -0.023 *** -0.023 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 ***
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
friend1 -0.093 *** -0.092 *** -0.079 *** -0.079 ***
0.017 0.016 0.018 0.018
friend2 -0.178 *** -0.178 *** -0.156 *** -0.155 ***
0.019 0.019 0.023 0.022
fparent -0.079 *** -0.079 *** -0.084 *** -0.084 ***
0.024 0.023 0.020 0.021
female -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.013 ** -0.013 **
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
age 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
dk -0.040 *** -0.038 *** -0.036 *** -0.037 ***
0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005
fi -0.057 *** -0.057 *** -0.052 *** -0.052 ***
0.002 0.001 0.008 0.008
fr -0.135 *** -0.134 *** -0.140 *** -0.141 ***
0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004
ie 0.040 *** 0.043 *** 0.025 *** 0.023 **
0.002 0.001 0.008 0.010
nl -0.112 *** -0.110 *** -0.111 *** -0.112 ***
0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004
se -0.138 *** -0.136 *** -0.134 *** -0.136 ***
0.003 0.007 0.001 0.005
obs. 10989.000 10989.000 10982.000 10982.000
log pseudolikelihood -7326.220 -7322.874 -7250.124 -7251.748
pseudo-R^2 0.038 0.038 0.047 0.047
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a
parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary
postsecondary level of education (edu2).
Table 3.4 Probit estimates of marginal effects on the likelihood
of preferring immigration restriction (anti = 1)
Specification 3.4A 3.4B 3.4C 3.4D
labor 0.182 *** 0.162 *** 0.151 *** 0.159 ***
0.005 0.006 0.012 0.028
labor*isb .. .. .. -0.011
0.022
labor*unemploy .. .. -0.072 -0.053
0.054 0.057
labor*employer .. .. 0.188 ** 0.204 ***
0.072 0.066
fiscal 0.208 *** 0.199 *** 0.208 *** 0.210 ***
0.006 0.005 0.016 0.009
fiscal*relinc .. .. -0.010 * -0.015 ***
0.005 0.002
fiscal*pension .. .. .. 0.011
0.048
fiscal*unempb .. .. .. -0.078
0.078
fiscal*otherb .. .. .. 0.001
0.043
edu0 .. 0.120 *** 0.134 *** 0.124 ***
0.013 0.015 0.008
edu1 .. 0.070 *** 0.082 *** 0.084 ***
0.006 0.013 0.018
edu3 .. -0.132 *** -0.127 *** -0.128 ***
0.022 0.028 0.026
media -0.020 *** -0.017 *** -0.018 *** -0.017 ***
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
friend1 -0.077 *** -0.054 *** -0.066 *** -0.068 ***
0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008
friend2 -0.162 *** -0.130 *** -0.136 *** -0.137 ***
0.014 0.017 0.027 0.030
fparent -0.077 *** -0.090 ** -0.081 ** -0.071 **
0.026 0.033 0.031 0.033
female 0.005 0.004 -0.002 -0.007
0.018 0.019 0.023 0.018
age 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
dk 0.022 *** 0.033 *** 0.049 *** 0.051 ***
0.000 0.001 0.004 0.007
fi 0.088 *** 0.096 *** 0.119 *** 0.124 ***
0.001 0.005 0.010 0.011
fr 0.044 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 ***
0.005 0.003 0.001 0.004
ie -0.165 *** -0.182 *** -0.179 *** -0.181 ***
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005
nl -0.004 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 ** -0.006
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005
se -0.277 *** -0.289 *** -0.280 *** -0.281 ***
0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
obs. 12042.000 12031.000 10591.000 10027.000
log pseudolikelihood -7150.992 -6991.492 -6131.410 -5817.939
pseudo-R^2 0.131 0.150 0.149 0.146
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a
parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary
postsecondary level of education (edu2).
Table 5.1 Comparison between univariate and trivaraite probit estimates
of coefficients for explaining anti, labor and fiscal
Dependent Independent Univariate Trivariate
anti (3.4D) labor 0.409 *** 0.380
0.072 0.491
labor*isb -0.030 -0.030
0.058 0.055
labor*unemploy -0.141 -0.142
0.154 0.168
labor*employer 0.518 *** 0.513 ***
0.172 0.164
fiscal 0.550 *** 0.772
0.024 0.905
fiscal*relinc -0.041 *** -0.045 ***
0.007 0.015
fiscal*pension 0.029 0.025
0.124 0.115
fiscal*unempb -0.211 -0.203
0.217 0.266
fiscal*otherb 0.005 0.005
0.111 0.113
edu0 0.315 *** 0.303 ***
0.020 0.094
edu1 0.216 *** 0.208 ***
0.046 0.042
edu3 -0.342 *** -0.321 ***
0.074 0.107
media -0.045 *** -0.040
0.012 0.039
friend1 -0.178 *** -0.162
0.023 0.132
friend2 -0.368 *** -0.340
0.085 0.304
fparent -0.190 ** -0.173
0.090 0.195
female -0.020 -0.017
0.048 0.040
age 0.005 * 0.005 **
0.003 0.002
dk 0.130 *** 0.130
0.018 0.161
fi 0.315 *** 0.321 ***
0.029 0.117
fr 0.078 *** 0.109
0.012 0.161
ie -0.519 *** -0.522 ***
0.016 0.016
nl -0.017 0.002
0.015 0.220
se -0.879 *** -0.852 ***
0.010 0.313
cons. -0.649 *** -0.783
0.121 0.770
obs. 10027.000 10027.000
log pseudolikelihood -5817.939 ..
Continued
Table 5.1 (2 of 3) (Uni.) (Tri.)
labor (3.1C) isb 0.017 -0.026 *
0.031 0.014
unemploy 0.130 *** 0.033
0.035 0.054
employer -0.073 *** -0.115
0.020 0.121
edu0 0.214 *** 0.207 ***
0.023 0.035
edu1 0.063 0.109 *
0.055 0.057
edu3 -0.458 *** -0.428 ***
0.026 0.025
media -0.056 *** -0.074 ***
0.016 0.020
friend1 -0.223 *** -0.233 ***
0.048 0.053
friend2 -0.484 *** -0.505 ***
0.024 0.048
fparent -0.201 *** -0.162 ***
0.034 0.037
female -0.007 0.014
0.030 0.048
age -0.004 *** -0.005 ***
0.000 0.001
dk -0.893 *** -0.868 ***
0.018 0.010
fi -0.389 *** -0.360 ***
0.022 0.017
fr -0.223 *** -0.194 ***
0.016 0.017
ie 0.018 0.074 ***
0.013 0.009
nl -0.636 *** -0.623 ***
0.010 0.004
se -0.945 *** -0.928 ***
0.020 0.020
cons. 0.294 *** 0.386 ***
0.056 0.070
obs. 11706.000 10027.000
log pseudolikelihood -6798.416 ..
Continued
Table 5.1 (3 of 3) (Uni.) (Tri.)
fiscal (3.3C) relinc 0.048 *** 0.059 ***
0.009 0.019
pension 0.045 0.075
0.087 0.107
unempb -0.044 -0.086
0.214 0.258
otherb 0.083 0.002
0.164 0.075
edu0 0.115 ** 0.152 **
0.045 0.076
edu1 0.061 * 0.107 ***
0.035 0.014
edu3 -0.301 *** -0.284 ***
0.085 0.093
media -0.054 *** -0.064 ***
0.018 0.019
friend1 -0.199 *** -0.198 ***
0.047 0.053
friend2 -0.398 *** -0.377 ***
0.062 0.066
fparent -0.213 *** -0.196 ***
0.052 0.051
female -0.033 ** -0.028 *
0.013 0.015
age -0.001 -0.001
0.001 0.002
dk -0.090 *** -0.093 ***
0.009 0.009
fi -0.130 *** -0.130 ***
0.020 0.022
fr -0.354 *** -0.395 ***
0.005 0.015
ie 0.063 *** 0.070 ***
0.021 0.023
nl -0.283 *** -0.302 ***
0.007 0.003
se -0.344 *** -0.362 ***
0.004 0.008
cons. 0.490 *** 0.491 ***
0.053 0.051
obs. 10982.000 10027.000
log peudolikelihood -7250.124 ..
log peudolikelihood (total) .. -15807.185
rho12 .. -0.025
0.444
rho13 .. -0.130
0.644
rho23 .. 0.487 ***
0.035
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
rho is the estimated correlation between the error terms from the two equations.
For example, rho12 is rho between the equations for explaining anti and labor.
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a
parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary
postsecondary level of education (edu2).
Table 5.2 Additional trivaraite probit estimates of coefficients
for explaining anti, labor and fiscal
Dependent Independent 5.2A 5.2B 5.2C
anti labor 0.249 .. ..
0.391
labor*isb -0.031 .. ..
0.053
labor*unemploy -0.180 .. ..
0.115
labor*employer 0.485 *** .. ..
0.133
fiscal .. 0.767 ..
0.934
fiscal*relinc .. -0.043 ** ..
0.020
fiscal*pension .. 0.016 ..
0.113
fiscal*unempb .. -0.249 ..
0.217
fiscal*otherb .. -0.001 ..
0.111
edu0 0.347 *** 0.322 *** 0.354 ***
0.035 0.061 0.024
edu1 0.236 *** 0.218 *** 0.237 ***
0.041 0.029 0.042
edu3 -0.407 *** -0.369 *** -0.431 ***
0.052 0.050 0.086
media -0.060 *** -0.050 * -0.065 ***
0.013 0.026 0.014
friend1 -0.224 *** -0.188 * -0.238 ***
0.051 0.098 0.031
friend2 -0.452 *** -0.399 * -0.483 ***
0.143 0.224 0.095
fparent -0.232 ** -0.197 -0.247 ***
0.092 0.158 0.075
female -0.022 -0.020 -0.025
0.051 0.035 0.044
age 0.005 *** 0.005 * 0.004 ***
0.001 0.002 0.001
dk 0.067 0.029 0.002
0.109 0.049 0.019
fi 0.255 *** 0.267 *** 0.217 ***
0.082 0.065 0.029
fr -0.016 0.080 -0.035 ***
0.021 0.133 0.009
ie -0.485 *** -0.495 *** -0.460 ***
0.014 0.012 0.018
nl -0.110 -0.075 -0.156 ***
0.082 0.126 0.012
se -0.962 *** -0.955 *** -1.014 ***
0.089 0.159 0.010
cons. -0.196 -0.564 -0.060
0.142 0.546 0.075
Continued
Table 5.2 (2 of 3) (5.2A) (5.2B) (5.2C)
labor (3.1C) isb -0.025 -0.020 -0.019
0.015 0.016 0.016
unemploy 0.034 0.033 0.041
0.057 0.061 0.060
employer -0.121 -0.166 * -0.163
0.119 0.098 0.102
edu0 0.207 *** 0.206 *** 0.206 ***
0.033 0.034 0.033
edu1 0.108 * 0.106 * 0.106 *
0.058 0.059 0.059
edu3 -0.427 *** -0.428 *** -0.426 ***
0.025 0.025 0.023
media -0.074 *** -0.074 *** -0.074 ***
0.020 0.019 0.019
friend1 -0.233 *** -0.234 *** -0.234 ***
0.053 0.052 0.052
friend2 -0.506 *** -0.508 *** -0.507 ***
0.044 0.041 0.042
fparent -0.161 *** -0.161 *** -0.161 ***
0.034 0.033 0.032
female 0.014 0.011 0.012
0.048 0.046 0.047
age -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001
dk -0.869 *** -0.870 *** -0.870 ***
0.012 0.013 0.013
fi -0.360 *** -0.359 *** -0.359 ***
0.018 0.017 0.017
fr -0.194 *** -0.193 *** -0.193 ***
0.019 0.018 0.018
ie 0.075 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 ***
0.009 0.008 0.008
nl -0.623 *** -0.622 *** -0.622 ***
0.005 0.003 0.003
se -0.928 *** -0.926 *** -0.926 ***
0.021 0.020 0.019
cons. 0.383 *** 0.379 *** 0.376 ***
0.069 0.075 0.074
Continued
Table 5.2 (3 of 3) (5.2A) (5.2B) (5.2C)
fiscal (3.3C) relinc 0.064 *** 0.057 *** 0.063 ***
0.012 0.020 0.012
pension 0.065 0.077 0.067
0.105 0.104 0.105
unempb -0.036 -0.082 -0.031
0.204 0.257 0.201
otherb -0.018 0.004 -0.017
0.094 0.071 0.094
edu0 0.154 ** 0.152 ** 0.154 **
0.071 0.077 0.071
edu1 0.104 *** 0.106 *** 0.104 ***
0.016 0.015 0.016
edu3 -0.284 *** -0.284 *** -0.284 ***
0.091 0.092 0.091
media -0.064 *** -0.064 *** -0.064 ***
0.019 0.020 0.019
friend1 -0.204 *** -0.200 *** -0.204 ***
0.049 0.052 0.050
friend2 -0.378 *** -0.376 *** -0.377 ***
0.060 0.064 0.061
fparent -0.201 *** -0.195 *** -0.201 ***
0.051 0.049 0.052
female -0.030 -0.029 * -0.030
0.019 0.015 0.019
age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.002 0.002 0.002
dk -0.092 *** -0.093 *** -0.093 ***
0.007 0.008 0.007
fi -0.134 *** -0.131 *** -0.135 ***
0.020 0.024 0.019
fr -0.400 *** -0.396 *** -0.400 ***
0.009 0.014 0.009
ie 0.061 *** 0.070 *** 0.061 ***
0.017 0.025 0.017
nl -0.302 *** -0.301 *** -0.302 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003
se -0.363 *** -0.362 *** -0.363 ***
0.007 0.009 0.007
cons. 0.491 *** 0.495 *** 0.492 ***
0.051 0.052 0.051
obs. 10027.000 10027.000 10027.000
log peudolikelihood -15811.942 -15813.149 -15818.847
rho12 0.187 0.190 0.318 ***
0.186 0.187 0.009
rho13 0.329 *** -0.068 0.360 ***
0.040 0.572 0.018
rho23 0.486 *** 0.487 *** 0.487 ***
0.033 0.035 0.034
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
rho is the estimated correlation between the error terms from the two equations.
For example, rho12 is rho between the equations for explaining anti and labor.
The reference group is UK males who had neither an immigrant friend (friend0) nor a
parent who was born abroad, and who attained the upper secondary or the nontertiary
postsecondary level of education (edu2).
Table 5.3  Seemingly unrelated trivariate probit estimates of coefficients
Dependent variable anti labor fiscal
isb -0.045 -0.013 0.050
0.040 0.016 0.046
unemploy 0.044 0.022 0.123 *
0.135 0.036 0.073
employer 0.479 *** -0.038 0.189 *
0.155 0.056 0.108
relinc -0.038 *** -0.039 ** 0.048 ***
0.009 0.017 0.013
pension 0.075 *** -0.062 0.061
0.017 0.059 0.092
unempb -0.191 ** 0.174 ** -0.059
0.090 0.088 0.164
otherb 0.095 0.041 0.008
0.123 0.188 0.157
edu0 0.343 *** 0.194 *** 0.145 **
0.026 0.028 0.066
edu1 0.238 *** 0.095 * 0.103 ***
0.035 0.050 0.015
edu3 -0.415 *** -0.412 *** -0.272 ***
0.092 0.030 0.098
media -0.066 *** -0.072 *** -0.064 ***
0.014 0.020 0.019
friend1 -0.238 *** -0.232 *** -0.206 ***
0.038 0.051 0.052
friend2 -0.486 *** -0.508 *** -0.384 ***
0.101 0.046 0.069
fparent -0.245 *** -0.163 *** -0.209 ***
0.074 0.032 0.050
female -0.013 0.011 -0.025
0.050 0.048 0.024
age 0.003 * -0.004 *** -0.001
0.001 0.000 0.001
dk 0.001 -0.874 *** -0.092 ***
0.015 0.015 0.009
fi 0.216 *** -0.361 *** -0.133 ***
0.023 0.021 0.015
fr -0.025 -0.191 *** -0.396 ***
0.016 0.029 0.005
ie -0.468 *** 0.071 *** 0.061 ***
0.016 0.012 0.015
nl -0.155 *** -0.627 *** -0.298 ***
0.007 0.004 0.005
se -1.012 *** -0.925 *** -0.363 ***
0.010 0.026 0.005
cons. 0.046 0.362 *** 0.434 ***
0.148 0.024 0.057
rho12 rho13 rho23
0.318 *** 0.360 *** 0.486 ***
0.010 0.019 0.034
log pseudolikelihood -15782.660 obs. 10027.000
Significance level indicators: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%
Heteroschedasticity-robust standard errors adjusting for intracountry correlation
The reference group is UK males who attained the uppersecondary or the nontertiary 
postsecondary level of education (edu2) and had neither an immigrant friend (friend0)
nor a parent who was born abroad.
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